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Abstract
Utilizing experimental data on choices over real monetary rewards made by university students, we provide evidence
that two measures of liquidity, income and employment status, significantly explain differences in patterns of
discounting. We find an average fixed cost component of discounting in the range of $5 for unemployed students and
near $0 for employed students. An increase in annual disposable income of $1000 decreases the fixed cost component
of discounting by approximately $0.20 to $0.25. These findings can help resolve the puzzle that some studies in the
literature find evidence of present-bias and magnitude effects and some do not.
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1. Introduction 
 
Experimental studies have documented a variety of discounting behaviors inconsistent with the 
traditional exponential discounting model. Perhaps most notable are the findings of present-biased 
preferences and of a magnitude effect.1 Present-bias describes time preferences of individuals who 
have discount rates that decline over time (Benhabib et al., 2010; Laibson, 1997; Meier and 
Sprenger, 2010; Takeuchi, 2011; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004).  The magnitude effect is that 
individuals appear to be more patient when experimental reward sizes are larger (Andersen et al., 
2013, 2014; Benhabib et al., 2010; Hardisty et al., 2013). Present-biased preferences are often 
modeled with hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic (β, δ) discounting functions, where present-bias is 
proportional to the reward amount.2 As such, estimated rates of time preference would not change 
with larger rewards meaning that the present-biased “β” term cannot explain a magnitude effect. 
One explanation for the magnitude effect is that individuals discount future outcomes with a fixed 
cost (Benhabib et al, 2010). The fixed cost discounting model treats the present-bias as a fixed 
dollar amount; discount rates will decline as the fixed dollar amount becomes smaller relative to 
the reward size. Thus the appeal of the fixed cost theory of discounting is that it can explain 
present-biased preferences in addition to the magnitude effect. 
However, the experimental evidence is mixed in regards to these “anomalies.” For 
example, Andersen et al. (2013) find little evidence of a magnitude effect and Andersen et al. 
(2014) find no evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting or fixed cost discounting. In contrast, 
Benhabib et al. (2010) find a statistically significant present-bias in the form of a fixed cost, with 
an average magnitude of $4 across their subjects. The differences in these results is then somewhat 
of a puzzle. As Andersen et al. (2014) note, most evidence of present-biased preferences stems 
from experiments with college-age students.3 Indeed, Benhabib et al. (2010) utilizes a sample of 
27 college-aged students and Takeuchi (2011) analyzes a sample of 56 students whereas Andersen 
et al. (2014) utilizes a representative sample of 413 adult Danes.  
One notable difference between college students and the general adult population is that 
the typical student may have lower income and less liquidity than a typical working adult. Perhaps 
this lack of income and liquidity is driving the differences in the results. If so, we may expect to 
see significantly more present-biased preferences among the subgroup of students that have less 
liquidity and lower disposable income. There is some previous evidence that liquidity constraints 
may be an important factor in explaining students’ intertemporal choices that appear present-
biased; Stahl (2013) uses hypothetical questions where one treatment is anchored to 2 days before 
Christmas, when the average student may be more liquidity constrained. The present study differs 
because we have real monetary rewards, we estimate the size of the fixed cost component of 
discounting for the more liquidity constrained individuals, and we relate liquidity constraints to 
the concept of a magnitude effect. 
Using experimental data on a sample of students who make choices over real monetary 
rewards, we test this hypothesis that liquidity is related to the extent of present-bias. We find 
evidence that employed students and students with higher income exhibit a significantly smaller 
                                                          
1
 Frederick et al. (2002) review experimental studies and list hyperbolic (present-biased) discounting and the 
magnitude effect among several other anomalies. 
2
 A consequence of present-biased time preferences is that we can see preference reversals for sets of choices that 
have identical rewards and intervals between the earlier and later rewards (Thaler, 1981). 
3
 However, use of college students as participants does not guarantee the finding of present-bias. See, for example, 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). 
fixed cost component of present-bias. Therefore, our contribution is to provide one explanation for 
the seemingly conflicting results regarding non-constant discounting behavior; researchers may be 
more likely to find evidence of a fixed cost component to discounting when the sample includes 
more individuals with liquidity constraints. This fixed cost component can then explain observed 
present-biased preferences and observed magnitude effects.  
The present study utilizes the data from Meyer (2015) but contributes to the literature in a 
different way. Meyer (2015) is primarily concerned with comparing time preferences from 
different experimental environments. Specifically, Meyer (2015) documents a substantial 
magnitude effect and finds that estimated time preferences do not significantly differ between two 
different elicitation mechanisms.4 In contrast, the present study focuses on liquidity constraints as 
one potential explanation for a fixed cost of discounting, which can in turn cause researchers to 
infer magnitude effects and present-biased time preferences.   
 
2. Experimental Data5 
 
We utilize data from 76 student participants stemming from 11 experimental sessions. The sessions 
were run at two universities between spring 2009 and spring 2012. Two elicitation mechanisms 
were used for the experiment; one was a variant of a Second Price Sealed Bid Auction (hereafter 
2PSB) (Vickrey, 1961) and one was a variant of a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (hereafter BDM) 
(Becker et al., 1964) mechanism. Our 2PSB mechanism is a matching task because individuals 
equate the present value of two rewards from two different time periods and our BDM mechanism 
is a choice task because individuals make a series of choices between a reference reward and later 
rewards. In each session, the experimenter described all rules of the mechanism (BDM or 2PSB) 
and the rules for determining experimental payments. The experimenter then guided the subjects 
through several hypothetical rounds to ensure understanding of the mechanisms. Within each 
session, subjects then completed multiple binding experimental rounds.6 
 Across the experimental sessions, reference dollar amounts varied from $10 to $500. Each 
respondent completed some rounds with no front-end delay (a reference time period of “now”) 
and some rounds with a 1 month front-end delay. The length of the interval between payment 
options varied from 1 to 6 months, depending on the session and round. Note that variation in both 
reference dollar amount and front-end delay is required to identify a fixed-cost component of 
discounting whereas only variation in front-end delay is required to identify quasi-hyperbolic (β, 
δ) discounting.  
All subjects received at least a $10 participation fee. Following all rounds, the experimenter 
conducted a random draw to determine which binding round would be used to determine 
experimental payments and a random draw to determine which participant would receive payment 
from the selected binding round. Thus, one subject from each session was paid according to the 
results of a binding round and the others received a participation fee. This approach has been 
utilized in previous research to facilitate larger experimental rewards under fixed budgets 
(Harrison et al., 2002; Meier and Sprenger, 2015). 
                                                          
4
 Meyer (2015) considers exponential and quasi-hyperbolic time preferences, but does not address the issue of a 
fixed cost component of discounting. 
5
 We describe only the essential details of the experiment here in the interest of brevity. Complete details of the 
experiment including sample experimental scripts are provided in Meyer (2015). 
6
 By binding, we mean that these rounds would potentially determine experimental payments.  
As mentioned, we are most concerned with the impacts of liquidity constraints on 
discounting behavior. Ideally we would observe information about participants’ access to credit 
markets to measure liquidity. However, this information is not available to us so we instead select 
two measures that are related to income as proxies of liquidity constraints: employment status and 
discretionary income as measured by post-experiment questions. Regardless of whether or not 
participants have access to credit markets through a consumer credit card, for example, there is 
reason to believe that the amount of currency on hand or in a checking account would be important 
indicators of liquidity for certain student purchases. For example, payments between students 
would probably take the form of cash or check and not credit card. Moreover, previous literature 
on consumption over the life-cycle, beginning with Flavin (1985), has commonly proxied liquidity 
constraints with unemployment. We code employment status dichotomously as employed (full-
time, part-time, or self-employed) or unemployed (not currently working). We attempt to isolate 
discretionary income with “Including any money that you earn, any money that is gifted to you 
(from parents, relatives, etc), and any other source of income NOT including any money that is 
used for tuition or educational fees, what is your best estimate of your personal income for this 
year?” The income question was intentionally phrased this way to capture all potential income of 
this dependent population, both gifted from relatives and earned through labor. Sample mean 
employment is 50% and sample mean income is approximately $5.2 thousand. 
 
3. Econometric Model and Results 
 
As previously mentioned, a fixed cost theory of discounting predicts that we will find both a 
present-bias and a magnitude effect in observed time preferences. Before turning to the more 
complicated specification that directly models this fixed cost, we first investigate the traditional 
exponential discounting model, which is well known for its simplicity. In the traditional 
exponential discounting model, the discounting function applied to time t is given by 
 �ሺ�ሻ = �� = ଵሺଵ+�ሻ�                                                                            (1) 
 
where � is the constant exponential discount factor and � is the constant exponential discount rate. 
A present-bias implies that individuals will be relatively more patient for choices that are anchored 
to a future date compared to choices that are anchored to the present. That is, the discount rate 
should be lower for choices with a front-end delay compared to that from choices with no front-
end delay if there is a present-bias. A magnitude effect implies that individuals will be relatively 
more patient for choices that involve larger rewards compared to choices that involve smaller 
rewards; the discount rate should be lower for larger reference dollar amounts. Thus, by comparing 
the estimated rates from two groups of individuals across these two dimensions, we can begin to 
establish whether or not one of the groups is more likely to apply a fixed cost to its discounting. 
The main hypothesis of this paper is that liquidity plays an important role in explaining a fixed 
cost component of discounting so we group individuals according to our two measures of 
liquidity—employment status and income level.  
 We specify an intertemporal utility function that is time separable and stationary over time. 
We also assume that the instantaneous utility function is linear for this analysis.7 An individual is 
                                                          
7
 As noted in the literature (for example, Andersen et al., 2008; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Laury et al., 2012) the 
assumption of linear utility will result in overestimates of discount rates if the utility function is truly concave. 
indifferent between the reference time period monetary reward, ��, and the delayed monetary 
reward,��+௞, when 
 �ሺ�ሻ�� = �ሺ� + �ሻ��+௞.                                                                                                                (2) 
 
The left side of equation 2 is the discounted utility of the reference payment option (��௘௙ሻ and the 
right side of equation 2 is the discounted utility of the delayed payment option (�ௗ௘௟௔�௘ௗ). Denote 
the latent index of the utility differences with 
 ∆� = ��௘௙ − �ௗ௘௟௔�௘ௗ.                                                                                                                   (3) 
 
We follow Hey and Orme (1994) and Andersen et al. (2012, 2013) in specifying a Fechner 
behavioral error. The Fechner error specification replaces (3) with  
 ∆�′ = ��೐೑−�೏೐���೐೏�                                                                                                                         (4) 
 
where ω is the behavioral noise parameter. We then specify the likelihood function in the same 
manner as described in Meyer (2015).8 Denote the choices of an individual from the BDM 
mechanism as ��, where �� = Ͳ for a choice of a reference payment option, �� = ͳ for a choice of 
a delayed payment option, and �� = −ͳ for an indifferent observation. Also, we indicate the 
observations from the 2PSB mechanism with ʹ����. The log-likelihood function over the n 
observations is then 
 �� = ∑ �ሺ�� = Ͳሻ ln ΦሺΔ��′ሻ + �ሺ�� = ͳሻ ln ሺͳ −��=ଵ ΦሺΔ��′ሻሻ + �ሺ�� = −ͳሻሺଵଶ lnΦሺΔ��′ሻ  +ଵଶ ln(ͳ − ΦሺΔ��′ሻ) + �ሺʹ����ሻ ቀln � ቀΔ��� ቁ − lnሺ�ሻቁ ,                                                                  (5) 
 
where I(.) is the indicator function, Φሺ. ሻ is the cumulative normal distribution, �ሺ. ሻ is the normal 
density function, and � is a behavioral error term from the 2PSB data.  
 Table 1 presents maximum likelihood results for the exponential discount rate using 
various subsamples of the data. We first group the individuals according to their employment status 
(column 1 is employed and column 2 is unemployed) and then according to their income level 
(column 3 is income at or below the median of $3500 and column 4 is income above the median). 
Overall, the point estimate of the discount rate is lower for employed individuals than for 
unemployed individuals and the point estimates are remarkably similar between high income and 
low income individuals. We then divide the choices into 1) those involving a front-end delay versus 
those that do not and 2) those involving a large magnitude reference reward ($100 or $500) versus 
those involving a small magnitude reference reward ($10 or $50). In terms of front-end delay, the 
estimated rate is substantially smaller for unemployed individuals and for low income individuals 
when there is a front-end delay compared to no front-end delay. This is consistent with a present-
                                                          
However, here we are interested not in the absolute magnitude of the discount rate but in differences in the pattern of 
discounting based on liquidity. 
8
 The MLE is programmed in Stata and clusters standard errors at the subject level. Harrison and Rutstrom (2008) 
provide helpful pedagogical notes for estimating MLE models of utility functions within Stata. 
bias. On the other hand, the estimated rates do not differ much depending on the front-end delay 
for employed individuals or for high income individuals.  
 
Table 1: Exponential Discounting: Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
(1) 
Employed 
(2) 
Unemployed 
(3) 
High Income 
(4) 
Low Income 
All Choices 0.479*** 1.037*** 0.788*** 0.789*** 
 (0.140) (0.277) (0.189) (0.240) 
Front End Delay    
Yes 0.433*** 0.879*** 0.799*** 0.608*** 
 (0.142) (0.235) (0.221) (0.194) 
No 0.604*** 2.24*** 0.521*** 1.989*** 
 (0.194) (0.615) (0.196) (0.508) 
Reward Size    
Small 2.482*** 65.947 3.124* 46.086 
 (0.877) (81.669) (1.836) (61.177) 
Large 0.445*** 1.000*** 0.772*** 0.745*** 
 (0.137) (0.269) (0.195) (0.233) 
Estimates correspond to the annual discount rate, � = ሺଵ�ሻଵଶ − ͳ, where � is the monthly discount factor. 
Standard errors in parentheses are estimated via the delta method and are clustered at the subject level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Estimates of the behavioral error terms are omitted from the table but available upon request. 
 
Moving on to reward size, we do find smaller estimated rates for large reward sizes relative 
to the smaller reward sizes which is consistent with a magnitude effect. However, the extent of the 
differences between the rates from large and small rewards clearly depends on employment status 
and income level. The estimated rate from the small reward sizes is 66 times larger than the rate 
from the large reward sizes for unemployed individuals whereas the small reward rate is only 5.5 
times larger than the large reward rate for employed individuals. Similarly, the estimated rate from 
the small reward sizes is 62 times larger than the rate from the large reward sizes for low income 
individuals whereas the small reward rate is only 4 times larger than the large reward rate for high 
income individuals. Thus, we have some suggestive evidence that both present-bias and the 
magnitude effect are more pronounced for low income and unemployed individuals. 
Next, to formally test for a fixed cost component of discounting, we pool all of the data 
and adopt the discounting specification introduced in Benhabib et al. (2010) and utilized by 
Andersen et al. (2014). We use the same log-likelihood function as described by (5) but replace 
the exponential discounting function (1) with the fixed cost specification from Benhabib et al. 
(2010), 
 �ሺ�ሻ = {ͳ                                                              if � = Ͳ�[ͳ − ሺͳ − �ሻ��]ሺଵ/ሺଵ−�ሻ − ቀ ௕௖�ቁ     if � > Ͳ                                                                    (6) 
 
where β<1 represents quasi-hyperbolic discounting, θ is a parameter that allows for a variety of 
discounting functions, b>0 represents a fixed cost component to discounting, and �� is the delayed 
reward dollar amount. Note that this specification is quite flexible because it nests the traditional 
exponential model with θ= β=1 and b=0 and the quasi-hyperbolic model with θ=1 and b=0. 
  Table 2 presents maximum likelihood results for several specifications. Column 1 is a 
baseline specification where we do not allow for any heterogeneity. We show in Meyer (2015) that 
the behavioral error terms9 are significantly related to whether or not an individual is employed 
and the reference dollar amount of the choice. Thus, column 2 and all subsequent columns specify 
that the error terms are functions of the reference dollar amount and the employment status of the 
individual. We do not see evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting or a fixed cost of discounting 
in columns 1 and 2, where we do not allow for heterogeneity in the discounting parameters. 
Furthermore, the estimate of θ is not statistically different from 1, suggesting little support for 
hyperbolic discounting in general. 
One main hypothesis is that liquidity constraints can increase present-bias. This suggests 
that employment and income should be positively related with the quasi-hyperbolic β parameter if 
the present-bias is a constant proportion of the reward. Similarly, employment and income should 
be negatively related with the fixed cost of discounting parameter b if the present-bias is a fixed 
dollar amount no matter the size of the reward. Columns 3 through 5 allow for this heterogeneity. 
Column 3 allows only the fixed cost parameter, b, to be a function of employment status and 
student income. Column 4 allows only the β parameter to be a function of employment status and 
student income. Column 5 specifies that both the fixed cost parameter, b, and the β parameter are 
functions of employment status and student income.  
Examining Table 2, we see no evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The β term is not 
statistically different from 1 in any of the specifications. Nonetheless, column 4 suggests that 
income and employment serve to negate any quasi-hyperbolic discounting that could be there. 
Thus, we estimate one more specification that constrains β=1 (Column 6). In general, there is some 
weak statistical evidence of a θ parameter that is different from 1 in columns 3-5. However, the 
estimated magnitude of the difference is small. Furthermore, this statistical significance no longer 
holds when we constrain the β parameter to be equal to 1 in column 6. 
The most important result of all is that we do find a fixed cost component of discounting 
for a subsample of this student population. Specifically, students with low incomes and who do 
not work are predicted to have a fixed cost component of discounting. A status of employed is 
associated with a fixed cost of discounting that is approximately $4.44 to $5.51 less than a status 
of unemployed. Furthermore, each additional one thousand dollars of student income is associated 
with a $0.17 to $0.25 decrease in the fixed cost of discounting.  
Next, we use the estimation results and sample data to predict the average fixed cost of 
discounting for two groups—employed and unemployed students. For employed students, the 
average predicted fixed cost of discounting ranges from $0.54 (Column 3) to $0.66 (Column 5). 
For unemployed students, the average predicted fixed cost of discounting ranges from $5.21 
(Column 3) to $4.55 (Column 5). Thus, we conclude that different experimental samples with 
distinct liquidity constraints could be expected to produce quite different results with regards to a 
fixed cost of discounting. 
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 We allow for the behavioral errors from the two experimental tasks to differ. 
Table 2: Fixed Cost Specification Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
β (Q-hyperbolic) 
      
    Constant 0.981 1.059 1.106 0.951 1.037 β=1 
 (0.0376) (0.0910) (0.116) (0.121) (0.131) (constrained) 
    Employed    0.147* 0.0558  
    (0.0863) (0.0932)  
    Income (Th. $)    0.00946*** 0.00573**  
    (0.00313) (0.00250)  
       
θ 4.069 3.906 4.262* 4.362* 4.303* 2.113 
 (2.359) (1.963) (1.937) (1.890) (1.913) (0.790) 
       
δ 0.0837* 0.159 0.195 0.184 0.191 0.0884*** 
 (0.0465) (0.137) (0.195) (0.175) (0.184) (0.0222) 
       
b (Fixed Cost)       
    Constant -1.620 0.367 7.137** 1.274* 5.825** 6.572* 
 (4.163) (0.467) (3.585) (0.717) (2.967) (3.395) 
    Employed   -5.509*  -4.442* -5.292* 
   (2.971)  (2.696) (2.857) 
    Income (Th. $)   -0.253**  -0.167** -0.249** 
   (0.105)  (0.0794) (0.101) 
       
ω (Behavioral Error 
BDM) 
      
    Constant 35.31*** 8.773 4.985 4.596* 4.354* 5.166* 
 (5.725) (6.035) (3.108) (2.517) (2.242) (3.080) 
    Employed  -9.748* -6.154** -5.645** -5.508*** -6.222** 
  (5.833) (2.903) (2.412) (2.117) (2.892) 
    Reference $  0.247*** 0.260*** 0.265*** 0.264*** 0.257*** 
  (0.0580) (0.0549) (0.0577) (0.0543) (0.0556) 
       
μ (Behavioral Error 
2PSB) 
      
    Constant 19.08*** 5.680** 5.940*** 4.664** 5.495*** 5.805*** 
 (2.846) (2.300) (2.107) (1.834) (1.731) (2.060) 
    Employed  -5.276** -5.069*** -3.955** -4.617*** -4.951*** 
  (2.165) (1.913) (1.722) (1.601) (1.872) 
    Reference $  0.178*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 
  (0.0233) (0.0229) (0.0231) (0.0225) (0.0223) 
       
LL -3369.30 -3188.25 -3135.10 -3154.10 -3127.26 -3141.37 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the subject level. 76 subjects. 5,180 observations. β and θ are tested 
against 1. All other parameters are tested against 0.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We present evidence that can potentially explain some of the seemingly conflicting results in the 
time preference literature.  Utilizing the discounting specification developed by Behabib et  
al. (2010), we find no evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting or a fixed cost of discounting when 
ignoring heterogeneity in liquidity constraints across students. However, we do find evidence of a 
fixed cost of discounting among unemployed students when appropriately modeling the 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, this fixed cost of discounting decreases as student disposable income 
increases. We find an average fixed cost component in the neighborhood of $5 among unemployed 
students. Differences in the fixed cost of discounting of this scale can be quite important when 
working with relatively small rewards. For example, Benhabib et al. (2010) find that a fixed cost 
on the order of $4 on average across subjects results in present-bias and a noticeable magnitude 
effect.  
Students volunteer for experiments because they receive payment for participation. These 
participants may then walk into the experiment with ideas in mind of what they are going to do 
with their small experimental participation fee. Then, they are presented with the information that 
they may not be paid on that day. This may not be much of an issue for a student with sufficiently 
high income or who is paid regularly for their labor. However, for a student with limited cash 
liquidity, this could play an important role in driving a fixed cost component of discounting. Only 
when the offered future reward is large enough to overcome this present-bias will the student 
accept the later payment.   
Where does this leave us? On one hand, we believe the results suggest caution when using 
student volunteers to infer time preferences, especially when using small rewards. The liquidity 
constraints faced by the typical college student probably do not match well with those of the 
general public. On the other hand, individuals in poverty are often liquidity-constrained and the 
target of policies to improve consumption smoothing.10 Thus, studying the time preferences of 
students may be helpful in understanding how similarly constrained individuals would respond to 
policies.11 We encourage researchers with access to more representative data to investigate 
whether or not unemployment plays a similar role in driving a fixed cost of discounting in the 
wider population. 
Finally, we acknowledge two limitations of the present study. First, we interpret the results 
as the “impact” of liquidity constraints on the fixed cost component of discounting. However, it is 
also possible that a fixed cost component of discounting causes the observed employment status. 
To firmly address the direction of causality, we would need an exogenous source of variation in 
unemployment which is not present for our subject pool. Second, we do not observe savings and 
borrowing rates available to participants outside of the experiment. One could potentially conduct 
a more comprehensive analysis of liquidity constraints by censoring responses at relevant interest 
rates as is done in Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002) and suggested by 
Andersen et al. (2014). 
 
 
                                                          
10
 For example, payday loan customers are often low-income and significantly liquidity constrained (Lawrence and 
Elliehausen, 2008). 
11
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point.  
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